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FOREWORD 
This paper belongs to a series of papers originating from the project "Social Security, Family 
and Households in Aging Societies" and also appears as a publication of the Netherlands 
Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI). 
Using a standard approach, it compares the future impact of changes in the age and marital 
composition of the population on state pension systems in twelve industrialized countries. 
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ABSTRACT 
In all Western countries included in this study, and under any demographic scenario, the 
aging of the population will reach, in the first half of the next century, a level which implies 
a dramatic deterioration of the performance of the state pension systems. In Eastern 
European countries, a similar level can only be reached if both mortality and fertility fall 
to an extent unforeseen at present although it is not improbable. Parallel to aging, 
substantial changes in the marital composition of the elderly and strong improvements in 
benefit entitlements for women will be observed. Different solutions to the pension problem 
are tested and compared. These show that there exists much difference between countries 
in this respect and that the dramatization arising from pure demographic considerations is 
in most cases exaggerated. 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
1. AGING AND CHANGES IN LIVING ARRANGEMENTS 
1.1. Demographic Setting 
1.2. Four Demographic Scenarios 
1.3. Aging 
1.4. Major Potential Changes in Living Arrangements 
2. SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES AND THE FUTURE OF STATE 
PENSION SYSTEMS 
2.1. State Pension Systems 
2.2. A Projection Model for Pensions 
2.3. Retirement, Work, Sex and Marital History 
2.4. The Retirees Boom 
2.5. Rise and Fall in the Labor Force 
2.6. Underfunded Pensions: How much will be paid in 2030? 
3. ASSESSING PENSION REFORMS 
3.1. Labor and Retirement Policy 
3.2. Contributory versus Pay-as-You-Go Systems 
4. CONCLUSION: Aging: Demographic Fate or Economic Opportunity? 
APPENDIX 1. Period of Reference for Data 
APPENDIX 2. Marital Status Projection Model 
APPENDIX 3. The Pension Model 
DEMOGRAPHIC, SOCIAL AND ECONOlLlIC ASPECTS OF THE PENSION PROBLEM: 
EVIDENCE FROM TWELVE COUNTRIES 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper gives an overview of the results of the international comparative study carried 
out under IIASA's research project entitled "Social Security, Family and Households in Aging 
Societies." The study consists of simulations of national state pension systems under a 
common set of demographic scenarios up to the year 2050. It includes 12 countries: Austria, 
Canada, Czechoslovakia, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the German 
Democratic Republic, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Poland. 
The methodology of this research is original in two respects. First, it makes use of dynamic 
projections of the population by marital status while previous works were only based on 
population projections by sex and age. This substantially improves the accuracy of pension 
modelling and allows for social and distributional aspects which have been largely ignored. 
Improvement in accuracy is evident for survivors pensions: current changes in nuptiality and 
mortality no longer permit to estimate proportions widowed by simply using fixed rates. 
Moreover, in Western countries, it also applies to contributions and old-age benefits because 
female participation in the labor force varies with marital status -- it is much higher among 
unmarried women than among married or cohabitating women, and among the latter it 
decreases with the number of children. Different birth and marital histories result in 
different benefit entitlements and the frequency of the marital histories is reflected in the 
marital composition of the elderly population. Modelling pensions therefore requires 
modelling family dynamics. This would preferably be done on the basis of de facto living 
arrangements which, at least in most Western countries, tend to substantially differ from the 
marital composition of the population. Unfortunately, very few countries can make the 
necessary information available. Also desirable would be to keep track of the children living 
with the mother, but the demographic model which is needed is too complex for use in the 
context of a comparative study. Consequently, family dynamics is reduced to marital status 
changes. 
A second original feature of this work is that pension projections are country-based rather 
than scheme-based. In many countries, the state pension system does not consist of a unique 
scheme but encompasses several large schemes -- blue- and white-collar workers, civil 
servants, self-employed, farmers, etc. -- and possibly tens of small activity-based schemes. 
Each retiree may and usually does receive more than one pension from different schemes. 
As scheme-information systems are not linked at present, scheme-specific data only provide 
a partial view on pensions and cannot be aggregated to obtain statistics on retirees. Relevant 
information is thus extremely poor: in those countries with such a system, the total number 
of retirees, the average old-age benefits or the average number of years worked by the new 
retirees are not known. Obviously, scheme-based pension projections face the same limits. 
In addition, results of these projections are often difficult to interpret when both substantial 
socio-demographic changes and changes in the respective share of the different schemes 
occur -- a situation which will soon prevail in several countries. National projections were 
therefore preferred, assuming the entire population benefits in all countries from a unique 
scheme and using indirect estimates of work-histories based on cohort/life-cycle 
rearrangement of labor force participation rates. 
The demographic setting and the results of demographic projections are presented in the 
first part of this paper with emphasis on aging and changes in the marital composition of the 
population. Part two deals with pensions. It includes a comparison of state pension systems 
as well as labor and retirement patterns, a description of the pension model, and a discussion 
of the results of pension projections. It also pays special attention to the inequalities among 
women according to marital history. The third part is devoted to assessing the possible 
impact of pension reforms. What would be gained by increasing the age of retirement to 65? 
Would a rise in the participation of women in the labor force solve the pension problem? 
Would a complementary contributory pension scheme perform better than the existing public 
pay-as-you-go pension system? These are three questions to which detailed and quantitative 
answers are given. The conclusion stresses the relevance of this simulation exercise for social 
policy and proposes to consider the pension problem in a broader socioeconomic context. 
1 .  AGING AND CHANGES IN LIVING ARRANGEMENTS 
1 .l. Demographic Setting 
Table 1, which gives the current basic demographic characteristics of the 12 countries 
included in the study, shows a great deal of diversity. No country is in all respects similar 
to another. In Czechoslovakia and Poland fertility is still beyond the replacement level -- 
respectively 2.17 and 2.32 children per woman -- while the total fertility rate is about 1.50 
in Austria, Italy and the Netherlands, and reaches 1.28 in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
With the exception of Austria, both low and high fertility countries have a low level of 
illegitimacy while most of the medium level fertility countries indicate a much higher 
proportion of births outside wedlock. Nuptiality is very high in Czechoslovakia, Hungary 
and Poland, where more than 90% of the women get married, but much lower in Finland, 
the Federal Republic of Germany and Norway, where less than 80% were ever married. 
Divorce is nonexistent in Italy, low in Poland (1 7% of marriages), concerns between 20 and 
25Oh of marriages in most countries, and 30% in Canada and the German Democratic 
Republic. The relatively high level of mortality, and the substantial difference between 
sexes, which is indicated in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland -- life expectancy below 
67 for men and 74.5 for women -- contrasts with the low level in Canada, the Netherlands, 
Norway or Italy where the mean life expectancy is higher by 4/5 years. This is also true for 
women in Finland and France but not for males, as both countries show the biggest sex- 
differentials in mortality, respectively 9.5 and 8.8 years. 
1.2. Four Demographic Scenarios 
Intensity, timing and sometimes direction of future demographic trends are uncertain. In 
most low fertility countries, fertility has remained relatively stable in the recent past. 
Nobody really believes in a new baby boom, but some expect or desire fertility to return to 
replacement level. On the other hand, one can also anticipate a further drop but no one is 
able to suggest a limit, if any. This is even more acute for mortality, which is decreasing 
rapidly at older ages in all Western countries and will play a major role in the future of 
aging. It is also hard to imagine how mortality will change in countries such as Hungary and 
Poland. Worsening is not unlikely in the short term, but no one can believe than no 
improvement will occur in the long term. And finally, will the fall in marriage and the rise 
in divorce continue, and how will this affect fertility? 
Country-specific answers to these questions are proposed in the different country case 
studies prepared under this project. However, the aim of this comparative study is different. 
It is not to produce realistic forecasts but rather to investigate the range of possible 
demographic changes and to study their impact in terms of aging and changes in the marital 
composition of the elderly. For this purpose, four demographic scenarios were selected after 
different trials. They are designed to allow international comparison and to bring a better 
understanding of the demographic processes. 
Table 1. Demographic settings around 1980/85.~' 
Population Total Births Life Expectancy at Birth Proportion Marriages 
1985 Fertility Unmarried Males Females Difference Ever- Ending in 
(1000s) Rate womenb' ~ a r r i e d ~ '  ~ i v o r c e ~ '  
Austria 
Canada 
Czechoslovakia 
Finland 
France 
FRG 
GDR 
Hungary 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
a' for exact dates, see ~ p p e n d i x  1
b' per 100 total births 
') marital-status life-table statistics 
1) A benchmark scenario with rates remaining constant at their 1980-84 level which 
shows how much change is already embodied in the age and marital-status structure of the 
population, and serves as a basis for comparison. 
2) A fertility scenario which assumes that fertility will return to replacement level. Thus, 
for  10 countries, it is a high fertility scenario while it corresponds to constant and decreasing 
fertility in Czechoslovakia and Poland, respectively. 
3) A mortality scenario under which age-specific mortality rates are decreased by 30% 
for  women and 45% for  men. In terms of life expectancy, it is roughly equivalent to an 
increase of 8-10 years for  males and 4-5 years for  females, so that the sex differentials are 
approximately reduced by one-half. 
4) A western low scenario which combines the most extreme demographic rates observed 
at present in Western Europe: West German fertility (1.28 child per woman), Swedish 
marriage and divorce (one-third never married, mean age at first marriage of 28 for  women 
and 30 for  men, one-third of all marriages ending in divorce), Swiss mortality (life 
expectation 74 for  men and 81 for women). 
All changes gradually take place over a transition period of twenty years, 1985-2005.'/ 
Mortality and fertility are assumed to be independent of marital status, an assumption which 
is aimed at neutralizing the impact of changes in the marital composition on overall mortality 
and fertility in order to control these two variables.'/ 
1.3. Aging 
Aging is certain. But how much aging? 
The scenarios' impact on aging is summarized in Table 2, which shows countries according 
to changes in old-age dependency ratio (OADR) over the period 1985-2030 for each of the 
scenarios as well as the OADR in 2030.'/ Four main conclusions arise from this table. First, 
aging is certain for  both countries and scenarios, the only exception being Czechoslovakia 
under the benchmark and fertility scenarios. However, sharp differences between countries 
and a marked dispersion can be noted. The Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands 
and Canada are top-ranking countries and will see their OADR doubling and possibly 
tripling, reaching a level situated between 35 and 60 in 2030, while at the other end of the 
spectrum, Eastern European countries will experience a more limited aging. Second, an 
increase in fertility will be of little help to prevent aging -- minus 2/4 points for all 
countries and -7 for  the F R G  -- unless fertility jumps far beyond the replacement level. 
Third, further mortality improvements would lead to dramatic levels of aging, especially for  
Western countries: about one-third in the OADR under the mortality scenario as compared 
with the benchmark scenario, but it is impossible to tell if this is an upper limit. Fourth, 
aging in Eastern European countries could be as strong as in Western European countries, 
if fertility drops to the actual West German level and mortality reaches the present Swiss 
level simultaneously. 
'/ There exists no rationale for  choosing a transition period of twenty years except it 
looks believable. However, calculations made using different transition periods show that 
conclusions are very robust and therefore depend very little on this assumption. 
2/ Interactions between changes in marital status, fertility and mortality are addressed 
in the country case study. 
'/ Number of persons 65 and over per 100 persons between 15 and 59 years. 
Table 2. Changes in old-age dependency ratio, 1985-2030. 
Changes 
1985-2030 
Scenario 
(Country and OADR in 2030) 
Benchmark Fertility Mortality Western 
20-25 FRG 45.8 
Netherlands 43.7 
Canada 37.6 
15-20 Finland 35.1 
Italy 34.7 
10-15 Austria 35.6 
France 31.6 
Norway 35.0 
5-10 GDR 28.3 
Poland 21.2 
Hungary 23.8 
0- 5 Czechoslovakia 20.7 
Canada 35.2 
Netherlands 36.3 
FRG 39.0 
Finland 32.5 
Italy 31.4 
France 30.4 
Austria 32.0 
GDR 27.1 
Norway 32.3 
Poland 22.1 
Hungary 22.7 
Czechoslovakia 20.9 
FRG 59.1 
Netherlands 5 1.3 
Canada 47.3 
Finland 46.0 
Italy 45.0 
Austria 46.1 
France 40.2 
Norway 44.8 
GDR 37.2 
Poland 28.2 
Hungary 32.9 
Czechoslovakia 27.5 
FRG 51.7 
Canada 43.4 
Netherlands 43.7 
Finland 43.4 
Italy 4 1.2 
GDR 41.0 
Austria 44.7 
Hungary 39.4 
Poland 34.6 
France 39.1 
Norway 39.9 
Czechoslovakia 33.5 
Not only aging but the timing of aging is certain. Figure 1 displays changes in the OADR 
under the benchmark scenario for each of the four fifteen-year periods between 1985 and 
2045. Typically, maximum aging will occur between 201 5 and 2030. Beyond this date, seven 
countries will not age any further or even will slightly rejuvenate, while the other five will 
experience a very limited additional aging. This pattern is also observed under the high 
fertility and low mortality scenarios. On the contrary, a fertility drop, as assumed in the 
western scenario, implies that aging will continue in all countries beyond 2030. 
1.4. Major Potential Changes in Living Arrangements 
Typically, the current marital composition of the elderly population is characterized by a 
strong contrast between the high proportion of males married -- between 73 and 82% in our 
sample -- and the much lower proportion of females married -- between 34 and 49% -- and 
by the low percentage of single and divorced for both sexes -- between 1.7 and 12.4% single, 
the proportion being slightly higher for women than for men -- and between 2 and 7% 
divorced, Italy excluded (see Table 3). 
The figures in Table 3 indicate that this pattern will change substantially. A main future 
demographic trend is definitely the strong increase in the proportion of single and divorced 
old men (see also Figure 2). While today they together represent no more than 10% except 
in the Scandinavian countries, they will be more than 20% in 2030 in Austria, Canada, 
France, the German Democratic Republic and Hungary, and around or more than 30% in 
Finland, the Netherlands and Norway under constant conditions. Czechoslovakia, Italy and 
Poland show lower values but will still experience a marked rise. If the western scenario 
would materialize, the proportion in all countries of single and divorced males would be 
between 25 and 40% in 2030 and about 45% in 2050. Similar values are reached for women 
although they correspond to a lesser increase. Under the benchmark scenario the increase 
is however more limited in Eastern European countries and Italy because the proportion of 
singles either remains constant or decreases. Figure 3 shows that the increase in the 
proportion of single and divorced (both sexes) occurs, except in Italy, over the period 1985- 
2030 with a maximum during the period of fastest aging -- 2015/2030 -- in nine countries. 
As very limited changes in the proportion of widowed among males aged 60 and over are 
expected -- between 10 and 15% under both scenarios -- the increase in the proportion of 
single and divorced will result in a sharp drop in the proportion of married. On the 
contrary, much uncertainty remains concerning changes in the proportion of women 
widowed, which at present ranges from about 40 to 50%, and in the proportion of married. 
Under constant conditions, little change is observed for widows except in the elderly 
population of the three German-speaking countries -- Austria, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the German Democratic Republic -- and of Finland which shows at present 
an exceptional sex imbalance -- masculinity ratio lower than 60 (see Figure 4). Similarly, 
the proportion of women married falls by 7 to 11 percentage points in Canada, Finland, 
France, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway and Poland. 
On the other hand, both the mortality and western scenarios result in a substantial decrease 
in the proportion of widowed. With the sex-gap in mortality progressively reduced to one- 
half of its 1985 level, the masculinity ratio would increase to values over 80 in 2030 and the 
proportion of widows falls under 40% in all countries except Hungary and Poland. Quite 
similar changes would occur in eight countries if the Swedish pattern of nuptiality was 
adopted: Austria, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Poland. However, while under the mortality 
scenario a noticeable increase in the percentage of women married was indicated in some 
countries -- Austria, Czechoslovakia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German 
Democratic Republic and Italy -- the western scenario leads to a decrease -- sometimes 
substantial as in Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands or Norway -- 
in most of the countries. 
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Table 3. Marital composition of  the population aged 60 and over, 1985 and 2030 
(percentage, total equals 100 for each sex). 
Males Females Masculin'ty 
Single Married Divorced Widowed Single Married Divorced Widowed Ratioa' 
Austria 1985 5.8 77.4 3.4 13.4 
benchmark 16.1 65.1 7.1 11.6 
mortality 15.1 65.1 7.1 12.7 
western 18.1 54.5 12.2 15.2 
Canada 1985 7.5 79.2 2.7 10.5 
benchmark 12.1 65.4 9.0 13.5 
mortality 11.3 65.1 9.6 14.0 
western 15.9 56.4 13.8 13.9 
Crechoslovakia 1985 4.2 76.7 3.1 16.0 
benchmark 7.8 69.0 7.3 16.0 
mortality 7.5 68.5 7.2 16.9 
western 9.4 59.0 17.1 14.5 
Finland 1985 8.4 73.9 4.4 13.4 
benchmark 24.0 51.7 11.6 12.7 
mortality 22.4 51.4 11.8 14.3 
western 23.5 48.7 14.1 13.8 
France 1985 7.9 76.2 2.8 13.1 
benchmark 16.1 63.4 7.4 13.1 
mortality 15.1 62.9 7.3 14.7 
western 17.2 56.8 12.7 13.3 
FRG 1985 3.9 79.4 2.3 14.5 
benchmark 23.7 56.7 7.2 12.3 
mortality 21.7 56.5 7.1 14.7 
western 25.1 50.4 12.6 11.9 
GDR 1985 1.7 78.7 2.3 17.3 
benchmark 11.0 68.7 6.9 13.5 
mortality 10.1 67.4 6.8 15.6 
western 12.8 60.5 13.9 12.8 
Hungary 1985 3.7 77.3 3.4 15.7 
benchmark 10.6 64.2 9.0 16.2 
mortality 9.9 63.5 8.9 17.7 
western 11.6 56.1 16.5 15.8 
Italy 1985 6.8 79.4 0.3 13.5 
benchmark 11.3 72.8 0.9 15.0 
mortality 10.7 71.3 0.9 17.1 
western 15.2 61.1 10.0 13.7 
Netherlands 1985 6.0 78.2 3.3 12.5 
benchmark 18.7 60.8 9.3 11.2 
mortality 17.3 61.1 9.3 12.3 
weatern 19.6 55.3 12.2 12.9 
Norway 1985 11.1 73.4 3.1 12.4 
benchmark 21.9 54.0 11.7 12.4 
mortality 20.1 53.9 11.8 14.2 
weatern 23.2 50.9 13.7 12.1 
Poland 1985 2.7 82.0 2.1 13.2 
benchmark 9.1 71.2 3.8 15.9 
mortality 8.7 70.8 3.7 16.8 
weatern 11.3 58.3 14.0 16.4 
number of men per 100 women. 
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As both the mortality and western scenarios are not exclusive, the potential for a dramatic 
fall in the proportion of women widowed is rather important although its likelihood is 
unknown. On the contrary, much uncertainty and discrepancy among countries exist with 
regard to both the size and the direction of changes in the proportion of women married. 
2 .  SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES AND T H E  FUTURE O F  STATE PENSION 
SYSTEMS 
2.1. State  Pension Systems 
Table 4 presents a simplified synopsis of the different state pension systems. These comprise 
old-age, disability and survivors pensions but exclude types of pensions which are not taken 
into account in the calculations: early retirement other than disability, low income and 
survivors pensions conditional on age, economic or health s tatus4/  Four countries have 
universal flat-rate old-age pensions: Canada, Finland, the Netherlands and Norway. All 
countries have earnings-related old-age pensions with the noticeable exception of the 
Netherlands, and allow early retirement under disability pension schemes. Provisions for 
survivors pensions for widows exist in 10 countries and represent a fixed share of the 
earnings-related old-age pension of the deceased husband. Consequently, in countries with 
universal pensions this concerns only the earnings-related part, and no survivors pension is 
paid in the Netherlands. In Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland survivors pensions cannot 
be added but if chosen, they can replace old-age pensions. Only the German Democratic 
Republic has no general plan for  widows due to the high female participation in the labor 
force. Five countries have recently taken general provisions to pay survivors pensions to 
widowers. 
Table 4. Simplified national pension schemes. 
Old- Age Disability Survivors 
Universal Employment- Males Females 
Related 
Austria 
Canada 
Czechoslovakia 
Finland 
France 
G D R  
F R G  
Hungary 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
4/ For a more detailed presentation of the national pension schemes see the country 
reports and J-P Gonnot and C. Prinz (1989) Pension systems and social security. Trends and 
national characteristics. WP-89-107.  Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for  Applied 
Systems Analysis. 
Figure 5 shows how the national systems differ in terms of old-age benefits granted 
according to the number of years worked. Countries can be classified into four groups. 
First and foremost are the countries with pure earnings-related systems: Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic 
Republic, Hungary, Italy and Poland. Among these countries, benefits are the highest in 
Italy -- 80% of the salary for 40 years worked -- and the lowest in France and Poland -- 
53% and 55% respectively of the salary for 40 years worked. Second, countries with pure 
or quasi-pure universal pension systems: Canada and the Netherlands. Benefits represent 
about 40% of the average earnings for single retirees in the Netherlands and Canada -- in 
Canada, only 25% for those who have never worked. Third, countries with two-tier systems: 
Finland and Norway. In Finland, minimum benefits amount to about 35% and 50% of the 
average salary respectively for single men and women, and reaches 65% and 80% for 40 years 
worked. For low and medium numbers of years worked, benefits are much higher in 
countries with universal pensions, especially with mixed systems. However, an exception 
is Poland where the benefits first increase with duration and remain constant after 20 years 
worked. Similar ceilings are indicated in Finland, Italy and Czechoslovakia, but only at high 
duration. 
Generally, full disability pensions are similar to old-age pensions while survivors pension 
benefits represent between 50 to 60% -- 80% in Poland -- of the earnings-related pension 
of the deceased spouse (see Table 5). 
Table 5. Survivors benefits (per cent of earnings-related pension of deceased spouse). 
Austria 
Canada 
Czechoslovakia 
Finland 
France 
FRG 
Hungary 
Italy 
Norway 
Poland 
2.2. A Projection Model for Pensions 
Projecting pension expenditures under a universal pension scheme is straightforward as per 
capita benefits vary only with marital status. Under an earnings-related or a two-tier system 
calculations of benefits are more complex. Earnings-related benefits received by an 
individual can be expressed as: 
yearly benefits rate * number of years insured * salary 
a formula which also holds at the aggregate level: 
benefits = yearly benefit rate * average number of years insured * average past gross 
salary * population retired 
0 5 10 15 20 25 SO 35 40 45 
Austrla + France O w  A FRG 
CSSR + Hungary 0 Poland A GDR 
100 
Figure 5. Benefits as a percentage of salary, according to the number of years worked. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, earnings, work-history as well as the probability of 
claiming for a pension are variables which are sex and marital-status dependent. Past 
salaries are usually reevaluated according to the increase in average salaries between the 
different years of activity and the retirement date. This suggests the following 
approximation for benefits at the aggregate level: 
benefits = yearly benefit rate * average number of years insured * average gross 
salary * population retired 
where only knowledge of the current average salary is needed to calculate the overall 
benefits served. 
This is equivalent to the assumption of a flat age-pattern of wages. A number of tests made 
with fairly pronounced age-patterns of wages indicate that this assumption does not 
introduce any serious bias in the estimate of the average benefits when the average salary 
is calculated over the whole working-life because of the offset between low salaries at  a 
young age and high salaries at an old age. Moreover, in several countries, there exists a 
maximum salary which applies to contribution and/or benefits and also tends to average 
income. 
The average number of years insured for married, divorced and widowed women are 
backward statistics which depend on age at marriage, divorce and widowhood. Exact 
estimates of these statistics could be obtained using a duration-dependent joint labor-marital 
status multistate life-table. However, building duration-dependent multistate life-tables for 
all the scenarios and countries in this project would require more time and data than 
available. Average number of years worked were therefore estimated from a cohort/life- 
cycle rearrangement of period sex, age and marital status-specific activity-rates. 
The rationale for  a cohort rearrangement of period activity rates is that an activity rate of 
80°/o at  age 40 in 1970 is equivalent to an average of 0.8 years worked for the members of 
the cohort 1930. A main simplifying assumption of the model is that within a cohort, all 
retirees have the same number of years worked corresponding to the mean age at  retirement 
even if they retire before this age. In addition, for  women -- for men, no difference in 
activity by marital status is assumed despite the fact that in some countries there exists 
marked discrepancies -- it is also assumed that all women who get married do so at  the mean 
age at marriage, all those who get divorced do so at the mean age at  divorce, and all widows 
who become widowed before the mean age at retirement do  so at  the same mean at  
widowhood. Women who become widowed after retirement age are considered married with 
respect to work history. As the classical marital status projection model does not distinguish 
between these two types of widows, it was decided to distribute them according to the 
proportion observed in the stationary population associated with the marital status life-table 
(observed widowhood versus no widowhood beyond retirement age). 
As already mentioned, the number of retirees by sex and age is not available from social 
security sources. The age-pattern of retirement was estimated from the age-pattern of the 
new retirees because estimates based on labor surveys or  micro-census seem to be always 
biased at older ages. Average survivors pension benefits were simply assumed to be equal 
to the product of the average old-age pension of the other sex by the proportion paid to the 
survivor. 
Benefits calculated along this line are per capita pension benefits. To calculate per 
beneficiary benefits as well as the number of retirees, one needs the proportion of retired 
among the population by marital status. For old-age pensions, this proportion is 
approximated by the maximum cohort age and marital status-specific activity rate. The  idea 
is that a maximum activity rate of 80% implies that on average 2040 of the members of this 
cohort have never worked and do not qualify for old-age pension. For survivors pension, 
the proportion observed, when available, is kept constant over time. In a few Western 
countries, the distribution of retired widowed according to the type of benefits they get -- 
old-age + survivors, or survivors -- is also available which permits calculation of the total 
number of retirees. 
Contributions are easily calculated as the product of the labor force by the payroll tax rate 
and the average gross salary, once labor force is estimated using sex, age and marital status- 
specific activity rates. 
This pension model has been developed to account for the impact of changes in the sex, age 
and marital composition of the population on earnings-related pension schemes, and thus is 
designed to be used in connection with projections of population by marital status. It is 
aimed at picturing the behavior of the key demographic and socioeconomic variables 
involved in the dynamics of changes. However, due to simplifying assumptions and 
difficulties to give a rational basis to the behavior of some variables, estimates of both 
benefits and retirees can differ from observed data in some countries. The main sources of 
discrepancy are the following. 
First, only one pension scheme, the national scheme for salaried workers, is assumed for the 
whole population while there might exist several schemes with different contribution and 
benefit rates. This also implies that the whole population is considered as salaried while it 
is certain that non-salaried workers are quite different from salaried with respect to 
pensions. 
Second, the observed salary basis used for calculating benefits can depart from the average 
salary when a truncation is applied either at the bottom or at the top of the salary 
distribution or when benefits are only partly indexed for wage increase. In addition, 
practice seems not to follow exactly law. 
Third, the average number of years worked used in the calculation is an approximation in 
many respects. It stands for the average number of years insured which is definitely less. 
Use of activity rates also leads to overestimated activity, especially for women, at ages at 
which part-time work is frequent. On the other hand, prior to the 1960s women working 
on family farms were not considered active by census while the corresponding years of 
activity are usually taken into consideration for calculating benefit entitlements. Finally, 
because the average number of years worked is calculated at the mean age at retirement, it 
is not possible to account for the dispersion observed in a given year. 
Fourth, the proportion of retired is calculated from the 1985 age-pattern of retirement 
which can originate some differences at older ages if this pattern has recently changed. And 
it is not accounted for that age at retirement depends on the sex, marital status and work 
history of the new retirees. In addition, estimating the proportion claim by taking the 
maximum activity rate within a cohort gives some rationale to this unpredictable variable, 
but is only a crude approximation as part of the inactives remain permanently inactive all 
of their life. 
2.3. Retirement, Work, Sex and Marital History 
Table 6 gives an estimate of the mean age at retirement in 1985 as well as the pensionable 
ages for men and women. On average, men claim for old-age pension at age 60.5 and 
women around age 59, but with marked differences between countries. Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, the Netherlands and Poland indicate the lowest ages -- around 59 for men and 
between 56 and 57.5 for women -- while both sexes retire after age 63 in Canada. Male 
seniority also differs greatly, ranging from 0 in France to 4.5 years in Italy, and the reverse 
in Canada, Finland and the Federal Republic of Germany where women retire at an older 
age than men. Figures in this table largely illustrate the importance of early retirement 
practices, especially for males, and the gap between legal provisions and reality. 
Table 6. Pensionable age and mean age at retirement in 1985.~1 
Pensionable Age Mean Age at Retirement 
Males Females Males Females 
Austria 
canadab) 
czechoslovakiab) 
Finland 
~ r a n c e ~ )  
FRG 
Hun ary 
Italy %..I 
 etherl lands^) 
Poland 
a) old-age and disability pensions (claimants for disability pensions aged 50 and over) 
b, estimate 
'1 1988 
Although men and women retire at quite similar ages they have very different working 
histories (see Table 7). In 1985, the average number of years worked can be estimated at 
40/42 years for men -- about 46 in the GDR, assuming a mean age at retirement of 65 years. 
For women, it varies from 13 years in Italy to 30 years in Finland and the GDR. However, 
working behavior has recently changed tremendously (see Figure 6). In most if not all 
countries, and for both sexes, activity at older ages has decreased following early retirement 
spreading or lowering of the legal age at retirement. Male activity has slightly decreased 
while female participation in the labor force has markedly increased, thus reducing the gap 
between men and women. A close pattern of activity for men and women is now observed 
in Czechoslovakia, Finland and the German Democratic Republic. On the other hand, in 
Italy and the Netherlands, female activity is still low. The changes in working behavior will 
result in tremendous changes in the average working-life: even under ceteris paribus 
conditions it will be raised by 6.5 years on average in 2030 -- +14 years in Canada and + l  1 
years in Hungary -- namely an increase of one-third in benefit entitlements, while it will 
decrease by about 3 years on average for men, a fall of 5/7%. 
Among women, sharp discrepancies also result from different marital histories. In the five 
countries included in Table 8, the average number of years worked by married women 
represents between one-half -- in the Federal Republic of Germany where single women 
economic participation is close to that of men -- and three-fourths of the work-record of 
single women (see also Figure 7). In the future, these gaps between single and married 
women will be reduced, substantially in Canada, France and the FRG, slightly in Austria 
and Italy. Another future consequence of these differentials is that the increasing proportion 
of single and divorced, and the eventually decreasing proportion of married in the elderly 
population will lead to a higher average number of years worked by women: under the 
western scenario it brings an additional one or two years. Marital discrepancies are also 
marked with respect to the proportion of women who, partly because they do not qualify, 
Table 7. Average number of years worked at mean age at retirementa) (constant labor force 
participation rates). 
1985 Changes 1985/2030 
Males Females Males Females 
Austria 
Canada 
Czechoslovakia 
Finland 
France 
FRG 
GDR 
Hungary 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Poland 
"1 indirect estimate 
Table 8. Average number of years worked at mean age at retirement. Women by marital 
status, 1985 and 2030~).  
1985 2030 
(constant activity rates) 
Single Married Divorced Widowed Single Married Divorced Widowed 
Austria 29.5 20.7 26.5 22.4 34.5 25.1 31.4 26.9 
Canada 25.3 15.5 22.9 17.7 34.9 29.8 33.5 31.3 
France 32.8 19.1 28.9 23.0 33.3 23.3 3 1.7 27.3 
FRG 39.3 21.2 33.4 23.5 36.3 23.7 32.9 25.9 
Italy 21.0 13.5 15.7 15.7 26.3 17.7 20.5 20.5 
indirect estimate 
Females 1970 f Females 1985 0 Males 1970 
Figure 6. Labor force participation rates, females versus males. 
Males 1985 
Females 1970 + Females 1985 0 Males 1970 Males 1985 
Figure 6. Continued. 
married f unmarried 
Figure 7. Labor force participation rates, 1985, females unmarried versus married. 
partly for  other complex reasons, do not claim for  old-age pension. Among married women 
it represents, for instance, about one-third in France and one-half in Hungary. However, 
this phenomenon will progressively disappear with the improvement in working-life and 
entitlements, and will add to the increase in the number of retirees due to demographic 
changes. 
2.4. The  Retirees Boom 
Figure 8 displays the rise in the number of old-age retirees over the period 1985-2030 under 
three scenarios. Under constant conditions, the number of retirees will increase by 40 to 
80% except in Hungary -- only +25% -- and in Canada where it more than doubles. Further 
improvements in survivorship, as assumed in the mortality scenario, would bring about an 
additional increase of 40 to 509'0, Finland being much above with 60%. Slightly higher 
figures are even obtained for Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland under the western 
scenario. Important to note is that the three German-speaking countries and Hungary will 
experience a much lower rise in the absolute number of retirees than the other countries of 
our sample. 
As indicated by Figure 9, under the benchmark scenario, the number of retirees will increase 
until 2030 and then either stagnate, as in Czechoslovakia and Poland, or decrease. In 
Hungary, the decrease will already start after 2015. Under the mortality scenario, the 
pattern of change is similar except that the number of retirees would continue to slowly 
increase or remain constant beyond 2030 in Czechoslovakia, France, Italy and Poland. 
2.5. Rise and Fall in the Labor Force 
As opposed to the common upward trend in the number of retirees, changes in the labor 
force show much variety in both direction and size among the different countries (see Figure 
10). Under constant conditions, the size of the labor force in 2030 would increase by about 
20% in Czechoslovakia and Poland compared with 1985, remain approximatively constant 
in Canada and France, decrease by 10 to 15% in Finland, GDR,  Hungary, Italy and the 
Netherlands, and drop by almost 40% in the Federal Republic of Germany. If fertility 
progressively returns to the replacement level by 2005, it only makes a difference of +5 to 
10% on the size of the labor force. As compared with the benchmark scenario, the western 
scenario implies an additional decrease in the labor force of 5/8 percentage points in Canada, 
Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Poland, and of 14% in 
Czechoslovakia which results from the drop in fertility to the West German level. This 
contrasts with low fertility countries such as Italy and the Netherlands where no additional 
changes are observed, or with Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany where changes 
in the marital composition of the labor force even allow a small differential rise. 
The time pattern of change in labor force size is illustrated by Figure 11. Under the 
benchmark scenario, the two high fertility countries, Czechoslovakia and Poland, would 
experience an increase in the labor force over the period 1985-2030 while a continuous 
decrease would be observed in the Federal Republic of Germany. All other countries 
indicate a rise for  the period 1985-2000 and afterwards a steady decrease. Under the 
fertility scenario, the time pattern of change is similar -- except for  Canada where the 
increase continues during the period 2000/2015 -- but with attenuated downward trends. 
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2.6. Underfunded Pensions: How much will be paid in 2030? 
Table 9 and Figure 12 show the relative cuts in benefits at different time points within the 
period 1985-2050 which would be necessary under the benchmark scenario in order to keep 
the balance between receipts and expenses constant at its 1985 level without changing 
contribution rates. This disregards whether the pension fund is fully, partially or over- 
funded in 1985. Calculations are based on changes in the ratio contributions/benefits and 
assume that benefits are fully indexed for  wage increases5/ As for  Eastern European 
countries, contributions are not specific to pensions nor do  they exist; a virtual payroll tax 
rate was used but plays no role in comparisons over time. 
Table 9. Percentage changes in average benefits 1985-2050, benchmark scenario, constant 
contribution rates. 
Austria 
Canada 
Czechoslovakia 
Finland 
France 
FRG 
G D R  
Hungary 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Poland 
2000 shows little difference to 1985 except in Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany 
(-18%) and the German Democratic Republic where the maturation of the recently 
implemented complementary pension already necessitates a cut of 36% of average benefits. 
In 2015, cuts by more than 30% would be necessary in Canada, Finland, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic (-52%) and the Netherlands, and 
by about 20% in Austria, France, Hungary, Italy and Poland. Czechoslovakia is the bottom- 
ranking country with only a decrease of 13%. In Poland, the figure remains constant all for  
the rest of the period while in other countries maximum values are reached in 2030 ranging 
from about -20% in Czechoslovakia to more than -50% in Canada, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the German Democratic Republic and the Netherlands. Finally between 2030 and 
2050, little change is indicated. 
Table 10 shows how other scenarios depart from the benchmark scenario in 2030. Fertility 
returning to replacement level would have no effect in Czechoslovakia and the German 
Democratic Republic, and a small negative effect in Poland. It would only limit the cut in 
average benefits by 3 to 9 percentage points in other countries. The narrowing sex-gap 
mortality scenario would subtract another 6 points in Canada and the Netherlands, about 
'/ Benefits are partly indexed for price increases in Eastern countries and fully in 
Canada. However, for long-term prospects, it makes no sense to extrapolate current 
inflation rates. 

10% in Austria, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic 
Republic and Italy, 15% in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. As illustrated by Figure 
13, this would lead to a fall in the average benefits of about 60% in Canada, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Netherlands, and of 70% in the German Democratic Republic. 
The Western European scenario would imply benefit cuts of 40% and more in 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, about 70% in the German Democratic Republic, and 
just a little less than in the case of the mortality scenario in other countries. 
Table 10. Percentage changes in average benefits, 203011985. Differences with benchmark 
scenario. 
Fertility Mortality Western 
Austria 
Canada 
Czechoslovakia 
Finland 
France 
FRG 
GDR 
Hungary 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Poland 
Parallel to the fall in the performance of state pension systems, changes in both nuptiality 
and mortality and the increase in the proportion of married women claiming for  old-age 
pension result in a decrease in the relative share of survivors benefits in several countries 
(see Table 11). Sharpest differences are observed in Czechoslovakia and Hungary where 
survivors pensions cannot be combined with old-age pensions. In the future, survivors 
pensions will be lower than the primary old-age benefits for  women and will therefore 
disappear. Austria and West Germany also indicate a strong reduction -- around 50% -- 
which will mostly result, as already mentioned, from improvement in the extremely 
unbalanced sex-structure of the elderly population. 
Finally, differences due to national discrepancies in pension systems are difficult to assess. 
One can only note that in countries like Canada, the Netherlands, and to a certain extent 
Poland, where pensions are not or little related to past employment, the substantial rise in 
the female work-record have little or  no impact on pensions. On the other hand, most 
countries, excluding Czechoslovakia, with earnings-related pensions seem to benefit from 
the decrease in benefit entitlements for  men as the share of women in old-age expenditures 
either stagnates or decreases (see Table 12). 

Table 1 1 .  Share of survivors benefits in total pension expenditures, 1985 and 2030 
(percentage). 
1985 2030 
Benchmark Western Mortality 
Austria 
Canada 
Czechoslovakia 
Finland 
France 
F R G  
GDR 
Hungary 
Italy 
Poland 
Table 12. Share of women in old-age benefits, 1985 and 2030 (percentage). 
1985 2030 
Benchmark Western Mortality 
Austria 
Canada 
Czechoslovakia 
Finland 
France 
F R G  
GDR 
Hungary 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Poland 
3. ASSESSING PENSION REFORMS 
The figures discussed in the last paragraph look, in some respects, like the description of an 
inevitable catastrophe scenario. Indeed, the burden of the demographic fate is impressive 
and inevitably leads to the question: Is it possible to preserve the actual performance of state 
pension systems, and which reforms should be undertaken in order to do so? 6 /  Four 
possible responses were selected among the numerous existing proposals: an increase in 
female participation in the labor force, a rise in age at retirement, an increase in 
contributions, and the creation of a complementary contributory-based pension scheme. 
Both proposals are those most frequently put forward and have a special long-term relevance 
as they are the ones which are likely to have the greatest quantitative impact. 
3.1. Labor and Retirement Policy 
A shift in the participation of women in the labor force toward the East German pattern -- 
one of the highest levels of activity observed among industrialized countries -- would have 
direct consequences on both the size of the labor force and the benefit entitlements for 
women. Results for  2030 under constant demographic conditions are illustrated by Figure 
14. Compared with the benchmark scenario, an increase in female activity either strongly 
limits the decrease or substantially adds to the growth in size of the labor force: +3Oo/o in Italy 
and the Netherlands, +20% in Austria and France, and still around 15% in other non- 
Scandinavian countries. It is important to note that it is much more than that gained under 
the fertility scenario. On the other hand, an increase in female activity would also raise, 
sometimes dramatically, the average benefit entitlements: about 70% in Italy, more than 30% 
in France and the Federal Republic of Germany, around 25% in Austria, 15% in Poland -- 
where the maximum pension is reached after 20 years of work -- and 10% in Hungary. In 
Czechoslovakia and Finland, almost no change is observed. The overall impact of both 
changes on the average benefits is shown in Figure 15. In most countries, it would limit 
benefit-cuts by about 10 percentage points with a maximum of 15 points in the Netherlands, 
figures which are above the results of the fertility scenario except for  Austria. As already 
mentioned, in the German Democratic Republic there are no survivors pensions because of 
the high level of activity among women. If such a system would be totally or partially 
applied in other countries, this would give additional substantial help to the state pension 
systems. 
An often proposed solution to the pension problem is to raise the age at retirement. In the 
present scenario, we assume that age at  retirement is progressively raised to 65 years for both 
males and females -- still under constant demographic conditions -- and that no survivors 
pensions are served under age 6 0 . ~ /  As illustrated by Figure 16, this would limit the 
increase in the number of retirees to 25% in most countries. Exceptions are obviously those 
countries with high age at  retirement: Canada, France and Finland. An increase in age at 
retirement also lengthens the average working-life and consequently results in increased 
benefit entitlements: between +6 and +14% for men and between +4 and +19% for  women, 
namely much less than with an increase in female activity (see Table 13). The positive 
impact on the average benefits is much more substantial than in the latter scenario in a 
majority of countries. No deterioration in average benefits would be experienced in 
6/ Taking actual performances of pension systems which are exceptional in many 
respects -- large labor force versus small number of retirees, high female economic activity 
versus low work-record for  women retired -- as a point of reference for comparison is 
probably questionable but unavoidable from a social or policy point of view. 
7/ Activity rates for  the age-groups 55-59 and 60-64 were also assumed to have an 
upward shift. 



Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, even under the western scenario for Czechoslovakia 
and Poland. Cuts in benefits will be limited to less than 1090 in Austria and less than 25% 
in France, Italy and the Netherlands (see Figure 15). Still, cuts would amount to about 35% 
in Finland and the Federal Republic of Germany, and to about 45% and 55% respectively 
in Canada and the German Democratic Republic. 
Table 13. Impact on average benefits per beneficiary of higher female economic activity and 
age at retirement (percentage). 
"GDR" Scenario "65" Scenario 
Females Males Females 
Austria 
Canada 
Czechoslovakia 
Finland 
France 
FRG 
GDR 
Hungary 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Poland 
3.2. Contributory versus Pay-as-You-Go Systems 
Within the framework of a pay-as-you-go system an obvious alternative solution to 
disequilibriums resulting from wide fluctuations in the size of the cohorts is to increase 
contributions. Actual payroll tax rates as well as balance rates for Western countries in 1985 
and 2030 under the mortality scenario are presented in Table 14. Only in Finland the 
pension funds are balanced in 1985. Small disequilibriums already exist in Austria, France, 
the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy. In Canada where the payroll tax rate is 
extremely low -- 3.6% -- contributions fortunately do not represent the main source of 
income for state pensions. On the other hand, the over-funding of the Dutch pension fund 
is due to the extremely high contribution rate under the mandatory disability insurance 
scheme. Although these figures probably correspond to real situations, they should not be 
interpreted as an exact measure of the present financial position of national state pension 
funds because of the many simplifying assumptions on which the modelling is based. Under 
the mortality scenario -- the worst case -- the state pension fund would be balanced in 2030 
in France and Canada if the contribution rate were set to 28% of the gross earnings, and the 
Netherlands to about 34%. In the first two countries, this corresponds to a substantial 
increase while no change should be necessary in the Netherlands. Such a level of 
contribution is high but still socially or economically affordable, as proven by the 
Netherlands, while in the other countries of this sample, it would not be the case: 41% in 
Finland, 58.5% in the Federal Republic of Germany, 62.5% in Italy, and about 65% in 
Austria! 
Table 14. Actual and balance contribution rates, 1985 and 2030~) .  
Actual Rate Balance Rate 
1985 2030 
Austria 
Canada 
Finland 
France 
F R G  
Italy 
Netherlands 
a) mortality scenario 
Similar calculations can be carried out for  Eastern countries in order to assess at which level 
to set the payroll tax rate in order to balance contributions and benefits when aging is at  a 
maximum. Table 15 presents estimates for  1985 as well as for  2030 under both the mortality 
and the western scenarios. In order to fully-fund national pension schemes in 1985, 
contribution rates should have been set to 9.8% in the German Democratic Republic, 16% 
in Czechoslovakia, 19% in Poland and 22% in Hungary in 1985. In 2030, the highest increase 
is observed in the German Democratic Republic -- plus 25.4% for  the western scenario -- 
and the highest rate in Hungary -- 39.4% and 45.6% respectively for  the mortality and the 
western scenarios. Compared with Western countries, Czechoslovakia, the German 
Democratic Republic and Poland belong in the lower corner while figures for  Hungary 
indicate a more difficult situation. 
Table 15. Balanced contribution rate for  Eastern countries. 
1985 2030 
Mortality Western 
Scenario Scenario 
Czechoslovakia 16.0 
GDR 9.8 
Hungary 27.4 
Poland 19.0 
If contributions are to be increased, would a complementary contributory-based pension 
scheme perform better than the existing pay-as-you-go system? A contributory-based 
pension scheme is similar to a life-insurance except annuities are paid instead of a lump 
sum. One saves money during activity and gets back interest and principal after retirement. 
If the scheme is run on a profitable basis, only part of the principal is returned. Such a 
scheme is advantageous if the premium paid to the insurance company in order to keep 
benefits constant at their present level is less than the corresponding increase in contribution 
under the pay-as-you-go system. Calculations have been carried out for  Western countries 
under two assumptions concerning the principal -- the whole principal refunded and only 
half of the principal refunded -- and for  real interest rates ranging from 1 to 3%. It is also 
assumed that every active starts contributing in 1990. Results are shown in Table 16 for 
males and widowed females who usually have a work-record not too different from the 
average female work-record. 
Table 16. Contribution rates corresponding to fully-funded pension schemes, 2030, 
mortality scenario. 
Pure Pay-as-You-Go 
Pay-as-You-Go + 
System Complementary Private Insurance Difference 
(rate of interest) 
Males 
Austria 
Canada 
Finland 
France 
FRG 
ltaly 
Netherlands 
all the principal returned 
half of the principal returned 
Austria 65.3 49.9 40.8 35.1 -15.4 -24.5 -30.2 
Canada 27.9 14.4 10.6 8.3 - 13.5 - 17.3 - 19.6 
Finland 40.9 36.4 30.7 27.0 -4.5 -10.2 -13.9 
France 34.0 34.0 27.3 23.0 0.0 -6.7 -11.0 
FR G 58.5 37.1 30.7 26.8 -2 1.4 -27.8 -31.7 
Italy 62.5 52.6 43.0 37.0 -9.9 - 19.5 -25.5 
Netherlands 33.8 42.9 39.7 37.7 9.1 5.9 3.9 
Widowed females 
Austria 65.3 
Canada 27.9 
Finland 40.9 
France 34.0 
FRG 58.5 
Italy 62.5 
Netherlands 33.8 
all the principal returned 
43.3 39.0 35.6 -22.0 -26.3 -29.7 
13.4 11.0 9.3 -14.5 - 16.9 -18.6 
3 1.9 28.6 26.2 -9.0 -12.3 -14.7 
29.3 26.0 23.5 -4.7 -8.0 -10.5 
3 1.3 28.8 26.8 -27.2 -29.7 -31.7 
46.8 42.5 39.0 -15.7 -20.0 -23.5 
51.7 48.0 45.1 17.9 14.2 11.3 
half of the principal returned 
Austria 65.3 56.4 46.1 39.6 -8.9 -19.2 -25.7 
Canada 27.9 19.5 14.2 11.0 -8.4 -13.7 - 16.9 
Finland 40.9 40.6 33.3 28.7 -0.3 -7.6 -12.2 
France 34.0 39.0 31.3 26.5 5.0 -2.7 -7.5 
FR G 58.5 39.6 33.5 29.5 -18.9 -25.0 -29.0 
Italy 62.5 60.4 49.6 43.0 -2.1 - 12.9 -19.5 
Netherlands 33.8 62.4 53.5 48.1 28.6 19.7 14.3 
The figures are eloquent. Even under conditions which a priori do not look very appealing 
for retirees -- only half of the principal returned -- the complementary insurance scheme 
performs much better than the pay-as-you-go system in all countries except the Netherlands 
and France for  women with an interest rate of 1%. It performs extremely well in two top- 
ranking countries for  aging: the Federal Republic of Germany which indicates the largest 
difference with the pay-as-you-go system, and Canada where it brings the contribution rate 
down to a low level. On the other hand, it does not really bring a solution to Austria and 
Italy where it still requires a contribution rate higher than 35% with an interest rate of 2%. 
Another negative aspect of this system is that it adds to sex inequalities as the returns depend 
on the number of years contributed but not linearly as in the pay-as-you-go system. This 
makes the system less attractive for  people with low work-records, especially women. 
However, the figures in Table 16 underestimate returns from private insurance for women 
as it was assumed in the calculations that the years worked by women were consecutive. 
4. CONCLUSION: Aging: Demographic Fate or Economic Opportunity? 
Aging is certain, and the pension question is common to all industrialized countries. 
Although this statement is definitively supported by our calculations, it is not the last word 
on the issue. Indeed, results of simulations presented in this paper have revealed another 
important aspect of the aging process: the specific conditions of this process lead to marked 
national discrepancies with respect to the solutions of the pension problem. 
In our sample, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands are top- 
ranking countries regarding aging. Under any scenario, their population will dramatically 
age and become very old. Like in all Western countries, the intensity of aging cannot be 
substantially limited by an increase in fertility, while a further decrease in fertility would 
not strongly modify the path of aging till 2030 but mainly result in an extension of aging 
beyond this date. Therefore, the uncertainty regarding the intensity of aging mostly depends 
on future mortality changes. At the other end of the spectrum, Eastern European countries 
would experience a limited aging unless both mortality and fertility fall sharply. 
Similar levels of aging can correspond to different socio-demographic contexts. In Canada, 
the main characteristic of aging is the retirees boom while in the Federal Republic of 
Germany it is the considerable shrinkage in the labor force. A more limited increase in the 
number of retirees is also a feature common to German-speaking countries and Hungary. 
Obviously, figures for  Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and, on 
the other hand, Czechoslovakia and Poland widely support the existence of a positive 
relationship between aging and the deterioration of the return from the state pension 
systems. In the Netherlands, where there is only a universal flat-rate state pension, the 
relationship is strict. This is also the case in Canada and Poland where benefits are poorly 
earnings-related. A main exception is the German Democratic Republic where the fall in 
the performance of the state pension system is due to the maturation of a recently 
implemented complementary pension scheme. 
Expressed in terms of difference with average benefits received in 1985, the impact of 
socio-demographic changes on the state pension system is dramatic: already around -20% in 
2000 for  the three fastest aging countries and the German Democratic Republic, -30% in 
201 5 and -50% in 2030 under constant demographic conditions, the mortality scenario "only" 
adding another 5 to 10%. The maximum is reached in the German Democratic Republic 
where necessary cuts in benefits would represent 70%. In other countries, deterioration 
starts after 2015 and reaches a maximum of 40% under the benchmark scenario and around 
50% under the western and mortality scenarios in Western countries; under the benchmark 
scenario it reaches 20% in Czechoslovakia and Poland, and 30 % in Hungary, and under the 
western scenario 45 and 50°h, respectively. 
Parallel to the deterioration in the return from the state pension system, substantial changes 
in old-age benefit entitlements will occur. Entitlements for men will decrease by 2 to 12% 
as a result of decreasing activity at  an older age, while sharp rises are to be expected for 
women: about 15% in both Germanies, 20% in Austria, Finland, France, 30% in 
Czechoslovakia and Italy, and 60% in Hungary with constant levels of activity and under the 
benchmark scenario. As a consequence the difference between male and female average 
benefits will be reduced to 20-30% in most countries. Exceptions are the Scandinavian 
countries where it will represent 5% and on the other hand Italy with 50%. Under the 
western scenario, changes in the average marital history would again reduce the difference 
by another 15% in countries like France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy. 
Similar reductions in the difference of entitlements between women of different marital 
statuses are also to be expected. 
Noticeable changes will as well occur with respect to survivors pensions. In Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland, the increase in old-age benefit entitlements for women will put an end 
to the existence of widow pensions as it is not possible to benefit f rom both types of 
pensions. In Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany, the proportion of total pension 
expenditure represented by survivors benefits -- the highest observed among industrialized 
countries -- will decrease from 20 and 25Oh to respectively 15 and 17% under the benchmark 
scenario, and absolute expenses will drop by 15%. Reductions to a slightly lower level in the 
share of survivors pensions are also anticipated in all Western countries except Canada where 
it is already low. 
Important to note is that the future living arrangements of the elderly population will 
substantially differ from the present situation. While in non-Scandinavian industrialized 
countries no more than 10% of the males and 15% of the females aged 60 and over are today 
single or divorced, they will represent between 20 and 40% in 2030 depending on countries 
and scenarios. For men, this means a tremendous increase in the proportion of non-married 
while for women it is unclear. Under the mortality scenario, the proportion of women 
widowed indicates a limited decrease and the proportion married a marked rise in the three 
German-speaking countries, Czechoslovakia and Italy. Under the western scenario, a similar 
decrease is observed for  widows while the three oldest countries -- Canada, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Netherlands -- and Norway show a sharp fall in the proportion 
of married. To which extent unmarried is and will be equivalent to living-alone is a 
question beyond the scope of this paper. However, preliminary calculations for  the 
Netherlands based on de facto living arrangements suggest that there will really be a 
substantial rise in the proportion of the elderly living alone.'/ 
Two types of responses to the question of deteriorating pension funding have been tested, 
each type offering an alternative: labor policy and pension reforms. First, it was assumed 
that female participation in the labor force would increase to the level observed in the 
German Democratic Republic. This would have two direct consequences: a strong increase 
in the labor force and a sharp rise in average benefit entitlements for  women in all countries 
except Scandinavia and Czechoslovakia. Overall, under constant demographic conditions, 
this would roughly limit cuts in benefits by 10% with a maximum of 15% in the Netherlands 
where benefits are not employment-related. Although it brings a clear improvement, this 
would not be sufficient to solve the pension problem. However, it should be noted that this 
would strongly reduce the gap in average old-age benefits between sexes to less than 10%. 
Additional gains of about another 10% are possible in Western countries if provisions for  
widow pensions are partially or totally released. Widow pensions have been made necessary 
in a context dominated by a high prevalence of marriage, a low level of economic activity 
among married women, and large sex-differentials in mortality. With changing patterns of 
'/ see Evert van Imhoff (1989) Modelling fhe Impacf of Changing Household Sfrucfure 
on Social Securify in fhe Nefherlands. NIDI. October 1989. 
nuptiality and activity, general provisions will soon appear anachronic if not contrary to the 
goal of economic independence for women. One open question remains: What would be the 
influence of a strong increase in the participation of women in the labor force on fertility, 
and could the fall in births offset the gains in contributions? 
Within the framework of a labor/retirement policy, an alternative solution which was 
simulated is an increase in age at retirement to 65 years. Except in countries with relatively 
higher ages at retirement -- Canada, France and Finland -- this would substantially limit 
the absolute increase in the number of retirees while in all countries the entitlements would 
increase much less than with the latter scenario. Impressively, this would solve the pension 
problem in Czechoslovakia and Poland under any scenario, and strongly limit cuts in benefits 
in Austria, France, Hungary, Italy, and the Netherlands. On the contrary, this does not 
bring a solution to both Germanies, the Scandinavian countries and Canada. However, it 
should be remembered that age at retirement, except for civil servants, depends on the 
economic and labor market situation, and cannot be easily modified by decree. 
Can the pension problem be solved by an increase in the contribution rate? If we consider 
the higher observed contribution rate -- 33.5Oh in the Netherlands -- as a criterion, the 
answer is definitively positive for Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, the German Democratic 
Republic, the Netherlands and Poland under both the mortality and western scenarios, 
namely the worst conditions. In the case of the Netherlands this indicates that, providing 
the simplifying assumptions used in the pension model do not distort too much reality, the 
state pension fund is largely over-funded at present. 
A more fundamental reform would be to partly move the pension system from a pay-as- 
you-go to contributory-based. Simulations have showed that for all Western countries with 
the exception of the Netherlands, a complementary savings-type pension scheme always 
performs better than the pay-as-you-go system. With a 2% interest rate, contribution rates 
reach acceptable levels, by Dutch actual standard, in all countries except Austria and the 
Netherlands. The  system performs extremely well in the two top-ranking countries for 
aging: West Germany which indicates the largest difference with the pay-as-you-go system, 
and Canada where it brings the contribution rate down to a low level. This system is 
attractive at a time when the shortfall of savings has become a major political concern in 
most Western countries. Nevertheless, it requires immediate implementation and limited 
inflation. Indeed, even with high inflation, it can be profitable if investments are targeted 
at providing benefits in kind, such as residence-lease or medical care, instead of cash 
benefits. 
Obviously, it would also generate much discrepancy as performance greatly varies from one 
country to another. A main paradox is that it has little to do with aging as exemplified by 
the case of the Federal Republic of Germany or Canada which, despite the highest level of 
aging in the developed world, could relatively easily solve the pension problem. Indeed, the 
paradox is even deeper if the scheme is run on a profitable basis where only part of the 
principal and interests are returned to the beneficiary. Then contrary to what is often 
assumed, the growth of the elderly population could result in a tremendous increase in long- 
term stable saving, offering large opportunities to investments and possibly boosting the 
economy. 
APPENDIX 1. Period of Reference for Data 
1. Population 
All projections were based on the average population for  1985 except for  Czechoslovakia 
which is based on an estimate of the 1980 average population. 
2. Occurrence/Exposure Rates 
Period occurrence/exposure rates for death, marriage, divorce and widowhood were 
calculated when possible for  the period 1980-84. Exceptions are: 
- Czechoslovakia: cohort estimates were used 
- Finland: 1981-85 
- FRG: 1985 
- GDR: average between 1980 and 1985 
- Italy: 1981, adjusted for infant mortality 
- Poland: 1984- 1985 
3. Retirement 
Retirement patterns were estimated from 1985 data except in Italy where information for 
1988 was used. 
APPENDIX 2. Marital Status Projection Model 
Marital status projections were prepared using IIASA's DIALOG Personal Computer 
software prepared by Sergei ~cherbov. ' /  
As several detailed mathematical descriptions of the multidimensional projection model are 
available, only a brief and simplified presentation is given.2/ 
1. Population Dynamics in a Close Population 
where S is the transition matrix corresponding to the time interval (t,t+h), K(t) is the column 
composition vector of m age groups, n states population at time t, b the number of births, 
z the last open-ended age-category. 
2 .  The Exponential Model 
Under the assumption of constant transition intensities between states i and j or i and d 
(deaths) over the interval (t,t+h), the matrix S can conveniently be expressed as a function 
of the matrix M of occurrence/exposure rates Mij(x,t): 
with 
/ See Sergei Scherbov and Vladimir Grechucha (1988) "DIAL" - A System for 
Modelling Multidimensional Demographic Processes. WP-88-36. Laxenburg, Austria: 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. 
2/  See, for instance, F.J. Willekens and P. Drewe (1984) A multiregional model for  
regional demographic projection, IN H. ter Heide and F.J. Willekens, eds., Demographic 
Research and Spatial Policy: The Dutch Experience. Academic Press. 
3. Specificities of the Marital Status Projection Model 
With four marital statuses, the number of possible transitions is nine (see Table A 1): three 
for  marriages (first marriage, remarriage of divorced, and widowed), two for  marriage 
dissolution (divorce and widowhood) and four for  death. All births occur among singles but 
result from the addition of natality of both categories. 
Table A l .  Transition flows-marital status model -- no external migration. 
Marital Status After Event 
Before Event 1. 2. 3. 4. Death 
1. Single (s) - 1 * * 2 
2. Married (m) * - 3 4 5 
3. Divorced (d) * 6 - * 7 
4. Widowed (w) * 8 * - 9 
Not yet born 10 * * - 
- no event 
* impossible event 
Then, for  each sex, we have the following component-of-growth equations: 
P,(t+h) = P,(t) + B(t,t+h) - M,(t,t+h) - D,(t,t+h) 
Pm(t+h) = Pm(t) + M,(t,t+h) + M,(t,t+h) + M,(t,t+h) + M,(t,t+h) - S(t,t+h) - D,(t,t+h) 
P,(t,t+h) = P,(t,t+h) + S(t,t+h) - M,(t,t+h) - D,(t,t+h) 
P,(t,t+h) = P,(t,t+h) + W(t,t+h) - M,(t,t+h) - D,(t,t+h) 
where B is birth and D is death, M marriage, S divorce and W widowhood. 
As the number of newly married (divorced) women equals the number of newly married 
(divorced) men as well as the number of newly widows (widowers) equals the number of 
deaths among married males (females), we also have the following constraints: 
Within a multistate demographic framework, events occurring to males are modelled 
independently of events occurring to females, and conditions arising from the above 
constraint equations are not likely to be fulfilled. In order to obtain consistent flow figures 
for the two sexes, ~ e i l m a n ' /  furthering the analysis of schoen4/ has proposed to average 
the observed differences in the number of events between sexes by using a harmonic mean. 
Under this approach, three steps are necessary for  calculating transitions. First, the number 
of events is computed separately for  males and females: for instance, the total numpers of 
marriage ~ ' ( t , t + h )  and Mm(t,t+h). Second, the adjusted total number of marriages M (t,t+h) 
is set to the harmonic mean of these numbers: 
Third, new numbers of marriages for  each age cateeories are recalculated using the 
adjustment factor M (t,t+h)/Mm(t,t+h) for  males and M ( t , t+h) /~ ' ( t , t+h) .  
3/ See N.W. Keilman (1985) Internal and external consistency in multidimensional 
population projection models. Environmental and Planning A 17:1473-1498. 
4/ See R. Schoen (1981) The harmonic mean as the basis of a realistic two-sex marriage 
model. Demography 18(2):201-216. 
APPENDIX 3. T h e  Pension Model '/ 
1. Benefits 
with m = single for  married under mean age at marriage 
with m = married for  divorced between mean ages at marriage and divorce 
TBEN = ABENc(s,x,m,t-x) * PRET(s,x,m) * P(s,x,m) 
ABENb(s,x,m,t-x) = PCLA(s,m,t-x) * ABENc(s,x,m,t-x) 
PCLA(s,m,t-x) = Max [LFPR(s,m,t-x), x>20] 
2. Contributions 
L F  = LFPR(s,x,m) * P(s,x,m) 
CON = PTR * W * L F  
3. Complementary Savings-Type Pension Scheme 
R = ((CON(2030)/TBEN(203O))/((CON( 1985)/TBEN( 1985)) 
MISBEN = ABENc(s,x,m) * R 
K K  = PREM * acum(i,AWY) 
PREM is obtained by using tabulations to solve the following system of equations: 
CUMBEN = MISBEN(l+i)^ 1 + MISBEN(l+i)^2 + ...+ MISBEN(l+i)^E(LEAR) 
CUMBEN = ( K K  - PK * (AWY*PREM)) * ( I  + dcum(MISBEN,i,LEAR)) 
where acum is an accumulation factor and dcum is an accumulation/depreciation factor 
which accounts for  both increment due to interests and decrement due to annuities payment. 
4. Variables List 
ABENc average per capita benefits 
ABENb average per beneficiary benefits 
A R  annual adjustment rate 
ASURc average per capita survivors benefits 
'/ This model is an extension of the one proposed by G. Malabouche (1987) L'evolution 
a long terme du  systeme de retraites: une nouvelle methode de projection. Populatiorr 1:9-38. 
AWY 
CON 
CUMBEN 
1R 
1 
K 
KK 
LEAR 
LF 
LFPR 
m 
MISBEN 
n 
P 
PCLA 
PK 
PTR 
PREM 
PRET 
R 
RET 
S 
TBEN 
W 
X 
YBR 
average number of years worked 
total contribution 
cumulated benefits over retirement period 
average annual inflation rate 
real rate of interest 
share of the old-age benefits of the deceased spouse paid to survivors 
capital (principal and interest) accumulated during activity 
life expectancy at age at retirement 
labor force 
labor force participation rates 
marital status 
difference between funded average per capita benefits and 1985 average per 
capita benefits 
number of 5-year projection periods 
population 
proportion claimants 
proportion of the principal refunded 
payroll tax rate 
insurance premium 
proportion retired 
changes in the ratio contributions/benefits compared with 1985 
number of old-age retirees 
sex 
total benefits 
average salary 
age 
yearly benefits rate 
